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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Appeal Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 78-2a-3(2)(j)-
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the trial court err in dismissing the Plaintiffs Complaint as against Logan City 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim 
against Logan City upon which relief could be granted. 
When reviewing a trial court's grant of a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the 
appeals court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider 
mem and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Alvarez v. Galetka. 933 P.2d 987,989 (Utah 1997) (quoting St. Benedict's Dev. 
Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194,196 (Utah 1991)). Because the propriety of a 
5 
12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, the appeals court should give the trial court's ruling 
no deference and review it under a correctness standard. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND 
ORDINANCES 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Article I Section 7 Constitution of Utah 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
42 USC §1983 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
Logan City Ordinance no. 2000-75 (The full text of the ordinance is set forth in 
Plaintiff/appellants Addendum at pages 19 through 21) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. The Complaint appears to challenge the constitutionality of a 
Logan City ordinance that regulates the practice of "booting" cars in Logan City, The 
Complaint also contains a claim against two private entities- a booting company and a 
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landlord. The Complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Article I Sec. 7 of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah. The Complaint alleges that the ordinance violates 
the due process clause of both the State and Federal constitutions. 
Course of Proceedings. The Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. All 
Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss, Oral arguments were held on all motions. 
Disposition at Trial Court The District Court denied Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment and dismissed the Complaint against all of the Defendants. 
RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD 
Because the Complaint was dismissed upon Motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure all of the facts alleged in the Complaint are presumed 
to be true. The following facts are alleged in the Complaint and are relevant to Logan City 
and this appeal. 
1. The only factual allegation in the Complaint against Logan City is that the City 
enacted an ordinance that regulates the practice of immobilizing a motor vehicle for 
purposes of parking enforcement "booting")- (Complaint t 4, Appellant's 
Addendum pg. 3) 
2. The Plaintiffs claim of liability against Logan City is brought pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. (Complaint % 1, Appellant's Addendum pg. 3). 
3. The Complaint alleges that the City's co-defendants, Cache Auto Booting Service 
and D's Bridgerland Apartments, Inc., booted Plaintiffs motor vehicle, under 
authority of the Ordinance. There are no allegations in the Complaint that the City, 
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or its agents or employees, booted the Plaintiffs motor vehicle. ( Complaint ^ 5, 
Appellant's Addendum pgs. 3 and 4). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court was right to dismiss the Complaint as against Logan City. A 
claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires the Plaintiff to plead and prove that he was 
deprived of some federal constitutional or statutory right under color of law. The Plaintiff 
alleges he was deprived of his property without due process of law. Some state action is 
necessary for there to be a violation of the right to due process or for conduct to be deemed 
to be under color of law. The facts alleged in the Complaint do not, as a matter of law, 
add up to either a violation of due process rights or state action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A CLAIM UNDER 42 U.S.C §1983 
AGAINST LOGAN CITY BECAUSE THERE WAS NO STATE ACTION 
INVOLVED IN THE BOOTING OF HIS MOTOR VEHICLE 
The Complaint does fail to state a claim against Logan City upon which relief can 
be granted. The Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C, §1983. To state a claim for 
relief under §1983, the Plaintiff must establish that he was deprived of a right secured by 
the United States Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged 
deprivation was committed under color of state law. Like the state-action requirement of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law element of §1983 excludes from 
its reach "'merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,'" Blum v. 
Yaretskv, 457 U. S. 991, 1002 (1982) (quoting Shellev v. Kreamen 334 U. S. 1, 13 (1948). 
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In order for the Plaintiff to state a cause of action based on a Fourteenth Amendment 
violation, the challenged conduct must constitute both color of law and state action. This 
requirement stems from section 1983 "color of law" limitation as well as from the state 
action language of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. For all practical purposes, according 
to the United States Supreme Court, "color of law" and state action are the same where 
Fourteenth Amendment violations are involved. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.. Inc. 
457 U.S. 922 (1982). This means that section 1983 regulates state and local governmental 
conduct, as distinct from purely private conduct. 
The Plaintiffs complaint was properly dismissed because there is no state action 
involved in the booting of Plaintiff s car. The complaint alleges that the Plaintiffs car 
was booted by Cache Auto Booting Service at the behest of Bridgerland Apartments, Inc. 
(Complaint f 5, Appellant's Addendum pgs. 3,4). While the complaint also alleges that 
this was done under color of the authority of the challenged City Ordinance (Complaint ^  
5, Appellant's Addendum pg. 4), there are no factual allegations in the Complaint to 
support this allegation and the language of the ordinance itself will not support the 
allegation that the "booter" acted at the request of Logan City. 
The United States Supreme Court has established several tests in modern Court 
decisions to determine when state action exists. The Court has found that mere state 
regulation of private conduct, even if extensive, is insufficient to support a finding of state 
action; state authorization of private conduct does not make the private party a state actor; 
to find state action, the state must participate in, order, coerce, or significantly encourage 
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the contested activity; state assistance to a private party, even if substantial, will not 
support a finding of state action, whether that assistance is in the form of direct financial 
aid, tax exemptions, monopoly power, or the grant of a license; the mere importance of a 
function carried out by the private sector is an insufficient basis upon which to find state 
action; and that for state action to be found, the function must be historically, traditionally, 
and exclusively governmental, (See American Mfrs. Mut Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 
40 (1999), San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Comm.. 483 U.S. 522 
(1987); Rendell-Bakerv.Kohn. 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Flagg Bros, v. Brooks. 436 U.S. 
149 (1978): Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.. 419 U.S.345 (1974): Moose Lodge v. 
Iras, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)). 
The Ordinance does not authorize or require private booting. It regulates it. 
Section 10.52.040A of the Ordinance authorizes the Logan Police to boot and to tow 
nuisance vehicles off of the public streets. (Appellant's Addendum pg. 19). Section 
10.52.040D of the Ordinance makes it unlawful to boot a vehicle without complying with 
the Ordinance and regulates the practice of booting. Section 10.52.040E requires that 
booting companies license with the City and limits the amount that they can charge. 
Section 10.52.040F requires landlords to provide certain information to their tenants 
regarding booting. 
There is nothing in the Ordinance that affirmatively authorizes booting, other than 
by the City of Logan under limited circumstances that are not relevant to this 
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Complaint. There are no factual allegations in the Complaint that any employee of Logan 
City booted the Plaintiffs car; that Logan City knew in advance about the booting; that 
Logan City authorized the booting; or that Logan City ever had custody of the Plaintiffs 
car or money. There are no facts in the Complaint that if proven true, would constitute 
state action for purposes of Plaintiff s section 1983 claim. The Complaint against Logan 
City was properly dismissed for this reason. 
POINT TWO 
EVEN IF THERE WAS STATE ACTION 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
Even assuming that there was state action involved in the booting of Plaintiff s car 
the ordinance is still constitutional and Plaintiff was not denied either procedural or 
substantive due process of law under either the state or federal constitutions. 
Procedural Due Process, The Plaintiff alleges that the Ordinance 
unconstitutionally violates the procedural due process provisions of the state and federal 
constitution because the Ordinance does not provide for a pre- deprivation notice and 
hearing. The Plaintiff is wrong in his assumption that a pre-deprivation notice and hearing 
is constitutionally required. 
Due process is a fluid concept. The Utah Supreme Court has said due process is 
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances 
but a flexible concept based on fairness. See V-l Oil Co. v. Department of Envtl Quality, 
939 P.2d 1192,1196 (Utah 1997) and Dairy Product Services. Inc. v. Citv of Wellsville. 
2000 UT 81, 149,13 P.3d 581, pg 593. 
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This flexibility allows due process to be satisfied in City initiated booting and 
towing by the availability of a post deprivation hearing on the underlying traffic offense. 
If there were state action in the booting of Plaintiff s motor vehicle, it would be the 
equivalent of a police office booting or towing a motor vehicle for parking enforcement. 
In Goichman v. City of Aspen. 859 F.2d 1466 (1988) the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that the reasonable availability of a post towing hearing, to adjudicate a parking 
violation, satisfied a car owner's right to due process and that no additional hearing was 
required to determine the validity of a city's impoundment and towing procedure. 
In City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715 (2003) the United States Supreme 
Court reviewed a decision challenging the City of Los Angeles towing of an individual's 
car without an expeditious pre or post towing hearing. The Supreme Court found that the 
actions of the City complied with due process of law. The Court relied on the case of 
Mathews v. Eldridge. 424 U. S. 319 (1976). In Eldridge the Court set forth three factors 
that normally determine whether an individual has received the "process" that the 
Constitution finds "due". The Court considered: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would 
entail. Id., at 333. 
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In City of Los Angeles v. David, the "private interest," was the loss of use of the car 
for a period of time. This is the same interest involved in this case. In City of Los 
Angeles v. David the second factor-concern for accuracy- was found to not require a due 
process pre-deprivation hearing because a relatively speedy hearing or trial regarding the 
merits could be had following the towing of the car. In the case before this court a 
relatively quick hearing, in either traffic court or small claims court, regarding the booting 
is available to the Plaintiff, and the straightforward nature of the issue-whether the car 
was improperly parked—indicates that initial booting errors, while they may occur, are 
unlikely. The third factor considered in City of Los Angeles v. David—the "government's 
interest"~argues strongly in the Logan ordinance's favor. Just as in the City of Los 
Angeles case, it would be an administrative nightmare to require the City to give notice 
and prior hearing before any towing or booting of a private motor vehicle could take place. 
Substantive Due Process. Plaintiffs Complaint contains several allegations 
against Logan City that can appear to be in the nature of a substantive due process claim. 
(Complaint fflf 13-22, Appellant's Addendum pgs. 9-14). The Complaint, although not 
entirely clear, seems to allege that Plaintiffs due process was violated because the City 
Council did not choose to protect the Plaintiff from private booting when the City enacted 
the Ordinance, but rather just regulated the practice of booting. It is apparent torn the 
Complaint that the Plaintiffs quarrel with the City stems from this decision to regulate 
rather than to ban booting. This failure to protect the Plaintiff from booters is not 
sufficient to state a claim of violation of Plaintiff s substantive due process rights. 
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"Nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to 
protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors." 
DeShanev v. Winnebago County Depyt of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989); see also 
Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226,1235-36 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting § 1983 claim, based 
on lack of state action, where the school failed to protect student from taunting and 
hostility by fellow students). A "failure to protect" claim under the Constitution is a 
substantive due process claim. The ultimate standard for evaluating a substantive due 
process claim is whether the challenged government action "shocks the conscience" of 
federal judges. Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 573 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Collins v. 
Citv of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115,126 (1992)). The courts look to the following three 
factors to determine whether the government conduct shocks the conscience of a federal 
judge: (1) the need for restraint in defining the scope of substantive due process claims; 
(2) the concern that § 1983 not replace state tort law; and (3) the need for deference to 
local policymaking bodies in making decisions impacting public safety. Id. (citations 
omitted). The federal courts have held that ordinary negligence does not shock the 
conscience, DeAnzona v. Citv & County of Denver, 222 F.3d 1229, 1236 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(citing DeShanev, 489 U.S. at 202), and that even permitting unreasonable risks to 
continue is not necessarily conscience shocking, Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 574 (citing Collins, 
503 U.S. at 128). Rather, a plaintiff "must demonstrate a degree of outrageousness and a 
magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking." Id. 
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Even if the City did everything it is alleged to have done and made the mistakes in 
enacting the Ordinance that the Complaint alleges, the Plaintiff would not have a 
substantive due process claim against the City. The City's alleged misconduct simply 
does not "shock the conscience." The conduct of the City in considering and enacting the 
Ordinance, is typical legislative conduct. There is nothing outrageous or illegal about the 
considerations the City Council engaged in when it considered the Ordinance and its 
possible permutations. The Plaintiffs Complaint clearly indicates a political gripe about 
what the City Council did or did not choose to regulate in the Ordinance and not a legally 
cognizable cause of action against the City. The claims against the private parties should 
have been brought as typical state tort claims and not as constitutional violations. 
CONCLUSION 
Logan City's Motion to Dismiss was properly granted by the District Court. Even 
assuming all of the factual allegations in the Complaint are true, there is no cause of action 
stated against Logan City. Plaintiff has clearly not stated a claim under the Due Process 
Clause of either state or federal constitutions and there was no state action involved in the 
booting of his motor vehicle. 
Dated this ( day of fl/Utj 2006. 
David L. Church 
Attorney for Logan City 
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